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Much confusion permeates discussions of the domestic support provisions of the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture and in the ongoing Doha negotiations. The paper clarifies some 
conceptual distinctions with a view to dispelling some confusion, enhancing communication, and 
facilitating the representation of domestic support provisions in economic analysis. It 
distinguishes between classification of policy measures and measurement of support, between 
measures and support, among measures classified in various categories, between applied support 
and commitments, and between applied support that counts towards commitments and applied 
support that does not. It highlights certain issues, including the role of criteria in classifying 
policy measures (such as those labelled green box or blue box measures), the role of de minimis 
rules in measuring certain applied support (such as Current Total AMS), and how the time 
specificity of applied support may complicate analysis of domestic support provisions. It 
introduces schematic charts to complement the verbal exposition of classification and 
measurement rules under the Agreement on Agriculture and as suggested in the 2004 Framework 
of the Doha negotiations on agriculture. 
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Classifying, Measuring and Analyzing WTO Domestic Support in Agriculture: 
Some Conceptual Distinctions 
 
“On domestic support, there is a lot of confusion: (a) on the difference between the allowed 
levels (i.e. the maximum levels) that members commit not to exceed, and the applied (or 
actual) levels of the various subsidies; and (b) on the different types or “boxes” of 
subsidies” (Khor 2006). 
 
Introduction 
The domestic support provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture (AA) and the domestic 
support issues being considered in the negotiations of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) or 
Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) continue to attract the attention of analysts, 
negotiators, and the media. The attention given to domestic support sometimes seems greater than 
would be warranted on the basis of the potential gains from improved global domestic support 
disciplines, compared to the gains that might be obtained in global market access. Nevertheless, 
domestic support is where the interest of many is focussed. 
Analyzing and understanding the existing domestic support provisions, the improvements 
that have been suggested and indeed the whole WTO domestic support pillar seem to pose 
particular challenges. The concepts are different from those used in market access, the 
terminology is peculiar to the domestic support pillar, and the measurements and data are similar 
to but still different from those used in other settings, such as the Producer and Consumer Support 
Estimates of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or under the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). Moreover, the variables and 
indicators used in domestic support are not easily represented in mainstream economic modelling. 
Apart from some of the terminological peculiarities of the AA regarding domestic 
support there are also some key distinctions which, when ignored, seem to contribute to 
confusion. They include such distinctions as  
o between measures and support,  
o among measures that are classified in different categories,  
o between applied support and a commitment on support, and  
o between applied support that counts towards the commitment and applied support that does 
not.    4
Additional concepts have been introduced in the Doha Round negotiations and related 
analysis. They require distinguishing between, e.g., the commitment on Overall Trade-Distorting 
Support (OTDS; referred to in the 2004 Framework as “Overall level of … trade-distorting 
support”; WTO 2004), on the one hand, and the sum of the parallel commitments and constraints 
applying to components of the support that counts towards the Overall commitment, on the other. 
The purpose of this paper is to clarify these issues and dispel some of the confusion, with 
a view to facilitating the consideration of domestic support in economic and policy analysis. The 
approach is to identify and explain the important conceptual distinctions that have proven to be 
particularly prone to being misunderstood or ignored. The choice of this particular set of 
distinctions is mainly governed by the experience of having worked with and tried to explain the 
domestic support provisions of the AA to analytical and technical audiences. It thus represents a 
personal view and is not a legal interpretation of the AA.  
 
Classification of Measures 
Measure and support. A common perception is that the AA requires countries to classify 
farm support into amber, blue and green boxes and there is also de minimis which complicates the 
classification but is disposed of by calling it a loophole. In reality it is of course both clearer and 
more complicated than that.   
  It facilitates the discussion to first distinguish between measures and support. The AA 
imposes discipline on all “domestic support measures in favour of agricultural producers”, with 
some exceptions (Article 6.1).
1 The discipline takes the form of a ceiling commitment on the 
amount of support that these measures provide in a year. Measures are thus usefully understood 
according to one of the dictionary meanings: a measure is “a step planned or taken as a means to 
an end; specifically: a proposed legislative act” (Merriam-Webster 2006).
2 The AA makes a clear 
distinction between measures and support in several places, but it also uses different expressions 
for an amount of certain domestic support, such as “level of support, expressed in monetary 
terms” (Article 1), support (Article 6.2 and Article 7), and value of payments (Article 6.5). 
The AA exempts some kinds of domestic support measures from commitment. 
Distinguishing between exempt measures and non-exempt measures is the driving force behind 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, references to articles and annexes refer to the AA (WTO 1995b). 
 
2 This meaning hints at the role of government, which supports the common use of “policy measures” as a 
synonym for “measures”. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its related agreements do not 
seem to provide a definition of measures. The General Agreement on Trade in Services essentially 
indicates that, for the purposes of that agreement, measures means measures taken by or on behalf of 
governments (WTO 1995b, Annex 1B, Part I, Article I.3(a)).      5
what has become popularly known as a system of coloured boxes: green, blue and amber. The 
AA does not refer to any boxes or colours.
3 Nevertheless, it is universally understood that Annex 
2 defines the green box and Article 6.5 defines the blue box. The WTO website adopted at an 
early point the depiction of categories of domestic support measures by means of boxes coloured 
amber, blue and green (illustrated by what looks like treasure chests). No box is shown for Article 
6.2 measures. Depicting an amber box on a par with the green and blue boxes makes it difficult to 
convey the idea that the AA uses criteria to define blue box measures, green box measures and 
Article 6.2 measures as three subsets of the all-encompassing set of “domestic support measures 
in favour of agricultural producers” and leaves the residual subset of measures undefined. 
  The most fundamental exemption is that of green box measures: measures that conform 
with the criteria in Annex 2 of the AA. The AA refers to green box measures in several ways. 
Article 6 refers to them in terms of the criteria set out in Annex 2 of the AA. Article 7 refers to 
them as those that qualify under the criteria set out in Annex 2. Annex 2 itself requires green box 
measures to meet the fundamental requirement that they have no, or at most minimal, trade-
distorting effects or effects on production. Annex 2 also requires exempt measures to conform to 
basic criteria and to policy-specific criteria and conditions.
4 
The common shorthand for measures exempted on green box grounds is that they are not 
trade-distorting. This shorthand of course ignores those measures that have some, but only 
minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production. The distinction is really between 
measures that are exempt on green box grounds, including those that have only minimal trade-
distorting effects or effects on production, and all other measures. These other measures are then, 
by the same shorthand, considered to be trade-distorting. 
Article 6.2 specifies the criteria that measures need to meet in order to be exempt from 
commitment on grounds of being part of the development programs of developing countries. 
Such measures include certain investment subsidies and input subsidies. The corresponding 
applied support is not counted towards the commitment. Article 6.5 (so-called blue box) specifies 
the criteria to be met by measures, specifically direct payments, that are exempt from 
commitment on certain other grounds. The value of those direct payments is not counted towards 
the commitment.    
                                                 
3 Blandford (2001) may have been among the first to point this out.  
 
4 The basic criteria of Annex 2 are: “(a) the support in question shall be provided through a publicly-funded 
government programme (including government revenue foregone) not involving transfers from consumers; 
and, (b) the support in question shall not have the effect of providing price support to producers.” Clause 
(a) thus sees the support through the lens of a government program, i.e., a sort of measure, while clause (b) 
sees the support in terms of its effects, not as a measure.     6
Law and economics. Annex 2 does not define the “trade-distorting effects or effects on 
production” mentioned in the fundamental requirement, nor is there any jurisprudence on its legal 
meaning. The legal character of the AA and its Annex 2 may define trade-distorting effects 
differently from how an economic analyst would define them. Where an economic analysis of a 
measure finds distorting effects on trade, a legal analysis under Annex 2 may fail to find such 
effects. The measure would then be exempt from domestic support commitment, in spite of the 
economic evidence of its trade-distorting effects. Likewise, where economic analysis finds that a 
measure has no or minimal trade-distorting effects or effects on production, a legal analysis may 
find that the measure does not meet all the requirements of Annex 2 and is therefore not exempt.   
Headings and criteria. The green box is sometimes invoked to exempt a measure from 
commitment along the following lines. The measure is described as, for example, payments for 
relief from natural disasters. This is the wording (somewhat abbreviated) of the heading of 
paragraph 8 of Annex 2. The argument then goes that the measure is eligible to be exempt from 
commitment because it is a payment for relief from a natural disaster and therefore is a green box 
measure. This argument fails to note the operational difference between paragraph headings in 
Annex 2 and the “policy-specific criteria and conditions” referred to in the first paragraph of 
Annex 2 and which are articulated under the respective paragraph headings. 
It is not enough for a measure to be generally described using the same words as a 
paragraph heading or having an objective similar to that of the heading. What matters is that the 
measure must conform to each and every criterion expressed in the relevant paragraph. In the 
example of payments for relief from natural disasters, five separate sub-paragraphs express the 
specific criteria that need to be met in order for the measure to be exempt (assuming that the basic 
criteria and fundamental requirement are also met). These criteria have to do with such things as 
the conditions under which eligibility for payments arises and the size of the payment. 
Exempt and non-distorting and exempt and distorting. Two kinds of measures are exempt 
from commitment if they meet criteria or conditions that are spelt out in Article 6 itself and not in 
Annex 2. These measures do not need to meet the fundamental requirement in Annex 2 of having 
at most minimal trade-distorting effects or effects on production. 
The first kind of such trade-distorting measures are those that meet the criteria of Article 
6.2. There is no commonly used colour or box that encompasses these measures. They are 
sometimes mentioned as being in the development box, but this term is also often used to 
describe a larger set of provisions than only those relating to domestic support (e.g., in market 
access). The notification formats of the Committee on Agriculture require them to be reported 
under the heading “special and differential treatment” (WTO 1995a). Measures that are exempt   7
on grounds of meeting the Article 6.2 criteria include investment subsidies that are generally 
available to agriculture in developing countries and agricultural input subsidies that are generally 
available to low-income or resource-poor producers in developing countries (and also support to 
encourage diversification from illicit narcotic crops).
5 Article 6.2 does not mention and does not 
limit the extent to which these measures may distort trade. This means that developing countries 
are able to exempt from commitment the kind of measures – input subsidies – that economic 
analysis has found to be the most distorting among five kinds that were analyzed: market price 
support, output subsidies, input subsidies and two kinds of area payments (OECD 2001).
6 
The second kind of trade-distorting measures that are exempt from commitment are direct 
payments under production-limiting programs if such payments meet certain criteria or 
conditions. These are listed in Article 6.5 and relate to the fixity of area, yields, and livestock 
heads, and the level of production on which payments are made, relative to a base level. Measures 
meeting these criteria are said to be placed in the blue box. 
The classification of measures thus generates three distinct kinds of domestic support 
measures: green box measures, Article 6.2 measures, and blue box measures, and a non-distinct 
or residual category of all other measures. The upper left-hand side of Figure 1 illustrates these 
distinctions. A measure qualifies for inclusion in a distinct category by meeting that category’s 
criteria or conditions. The so-called amber box has no such distinguishing criteria or conditions: it 
consists of the measures that do not qualify for any of the distinct categories.
7 A relatively 
popular document issued by the WTO introduces the idea that there are basically two categories 
of domestic support: non-distorting or green box, on the one hand, and distorting support on the 
other: “(often referred to as “Amber Box” measures)” (WTO 2000a). While clearly the result of 
tackling a communications challenge, it illustrates the prevalence of not distinguishing between 
measures and support and of using the imprecise term “amber”. 
 
Measurement of Support 
                                                 
5 The attention given in Article 6.2 to measures having to be “generally available” parallels in a sense the 
mention in Article 1(a) of “non-product-specific support provided in favour of agricultural producers in 
general”. It also seems a counterpoint to the important role played by “specificity” in the rules about 
subsidies in the Agreement on SCM. 
 
6 Some kinds of input subsidies in developing countries, such as the promotion of technology transfer, may 
have different characteristics than those analyzed by the OECD. 
 
7 While Annex 3 of the AA (Domestic Support: Calculation of Aggregate Measurement of Support) is 
helpful in understanding what kinds of measures need to be accounted for in measuring AMS support, 
Annex 3 is not exhaustive nor is it a definition of the so-called amber box.   8
Ceiling commitment and applied support. One of the most significant distinctions of the 
AA is the one between a ceiling commitment on distorting support and the measured applied 
support that counts towards that ceiling. This is also a distinction that has proven to be 
particularly difficult to articulate in popular media, where both the ceilings on support and the 
applied support amounts are often referred to simply as support. A bound tariff and the applied 
tariff in market access relate to each other in a similar way as the bound ceiling commitment and 
the measured support in domestic support. However, the measured support that counts towards 
the commitment is more complicated to express than an applied tariff. The support needs to be 
measured in certain ways, and there are exemptions from what needs to be counted towards the 
ceiling commitment. Exemptions under the de minimis rules even derive partly from the relative 
amount of support itself and not only from exogenous criteria. 
Article 6.1 refers to a Member’s domestic support commitment and how it is expressed, 
i.e., in terms of Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (Total AMS) and “Annual and Final 
Bound Commitment Levels”. The latter is simply the heading of one column in a Member’s 
Schedule of Concessions and Commitments (Part IV, Section I).
8 In that column are inscribed the 
yearly commitment levels, which from 2000 onwards is a constant yearly amount (constant from 
2004 for developing countries). Article 3 of the AA stipulates that, subject to the provisions of 
Article 6, which allows for the exemption of certain measures as discussed above, support in 
favour of domestic producers must not exceed the commitment level of the Schedule.
9 In other 
words, the commitment level is a ceiling commitment and, as stipulated in Article 6.1, it is 
expressed in terms of Total AMS. 
AMS and Total AMS. The measurement of applied support that counts towards the Total 
AMS commitment derives from a number of Aggregate Measurements of Support (AMSs). The 
distinction between an AMS and a Total AMS is critical. The AA defines both AMS and Total 
AMS. The definition of AMS essentially says that it is the annual level of support, expressed in 
monetary terms, provided in favour of producers, other than support provided through green box 
measures.
10 An interesting aspect of this definition is that only support provided through green 
                                                 
8 A commitment is “a legally binding undertaking specific to a country under one of the agreements 
administered by the WTO” (Goode 1997). Article 3 of the AA makes the domestic support commitments 
an integral part of the GATT 1994, which is administered by the WTO. Bound tariffs are legally binding in 
the same way.  
 
9 Article 3 refers to domestic producers while Article 6.1 refers to agricultural producers. The significance 
of this difference is unclear. 
 
10 The exact wording is: “ ‘Aggregate Measurement of Support’ and ‘AMS’ mean the annual level of 
support, expressed in monetary terms, provided for an agricultural product in favour of the producers of the   9
box measures is excluded from AMS, which means that, technically, support provided through 
Article 6.2 measures and blue box measures is regarded as AMS support.  
The definition of Total AMS essentially says that it is the sum of all AMSs (“all 
aggregate measurements of support”).
11 While the AA explicitly refers to AMSs in plural, this 
expression is rarely used in descriptions of the AA. The idea of plural AMSs was explicit, 
however, in the 2004 Framework (WTO 2004). The definition of Total AMS hinges on the 
distinction between “aggregate” and “total”. The “aggregate” in AMS refers to the aggregation of 
support across a variety of policies or measures, such as direct payments, input subsidies, and 
market price support.
12 The “total” in Total AMS refers to the summation of many AMSs into one 
single Total AMS.  
The AA distinguishes between AMSs that were specified in calculating support for the 
base period, on the one hand, and AMSs calculated for a current year (i.e., any year from 1995 
onwards), on the other. The calculations for the base period are incorporated into the Member’s 
Schedule by a reference in Part IV, Section I. That referenced material is often referred to as the 
Member’s AGST material, in line with the document identification code assigned to it by the 
WTO Secretariat.
13 According to Article 1(a), the calculations of AMSs for the current year need 
to take “into account the constituent data and methodology” of the referenced material, as well as 
being “calculated in accordance with” the rules of Annex 3 of the AA. 
Total AMS commitment and Current Total AMS. While the AA mentions the support 
provided in the “base period”, it also introduces the perhaps more important “Annual and Final 
Bound Commitment Levels”. The bound commitment level, or Total AMS commitment, is a 
ceiling amount that limits the applied yearly support that is calculated according to given rules. In 
most cases it is possible to trace a Member’s present commitment on Total AMS back to the 
calculations of support in the referenced supporting material for the base period.  
                                                                                                                                                 
basic agricultural product or non-product-specific support provided in favour of agricultural producers in 
general, other than support provided under programs that qualify as exempt from reduction under Annex 2 
to this Agreement …”, and the AA goes on to make the crucial distinction between base year support and 
current support (Article 1(a)). 
  
11 The definition also refers to Equivalent Measurements of Support (EMSs), which are calculated 
somewhat differently from AMSs but are summed, along with the AMSs, into the Total AMS. Only the EU 
now notifies EMS support so for ease of exposition they are assumed here to mean the same as AMSs. 
 
12 The Committee on Agriculture’s notification formats refer to the policies or measures as “measure types” 
(WTO 1995a). The idea of aggregation also arises in the Agreement on SCM (Annex IV, paragraph 6): “In 
determining the overall rate of subsidization in a given year, subsidies given under different programmes 
and by different authorities in the territory of a Member shall be aggregated” (emphasis added). 
 
13 Part IV, Section I, of the Schedule of Members that have acceded to the WTO since 1995 refers to the 
final set of calculations for the relevant base period, identified differently than with an AGST code.   10
The AA makes the crucial distinction between the Total AMS commitment and the 
Current Total AMS. The Current Total AMS is the level of support actually provided in a year, 
i.e., an applied amount. Under Article 1(h) it is “calculated in accordance with” both the rules of 
the AA and the constituent data and methodology in the referenced material.
14 Article 6.3 says 
that if the Current Total AMS does not exceed the scheduled Total AMS commitment, the 
Member is considered to be in compliance with its commitment. The Member’s obligation not to 
exceed the Total AMS commitment is stated in Article 3.2.  
Calculating Current Total AMS in accordance with the rules of the AA means that some 
support is not accounted for in Current Total AMS. Green box support is excluded from AMSs 
because green box measures are not subject to reduction commitment. Article 6.2 measures are 
exempt from and blue box payments are not subject to reduction commitment, and the 
corresponding support is therefore not included in Current Total AMS.
15  
De minimis AMS and non-de minimis AMS. The Current Total AMS may be affected by a 
Member’s use of the de minimis rules of Article 6.4. These rules essentially say that if an AMS is 
small enough, it need not be included when summing AMSs across products and any non-
product-specific AMS to form the Current Total AMS.
 16 The idea of “small enough” has 
parallels, in different contexts, in the Agreement on SCM.
17 The AA also specifies what it takes 
for an AMS to be small enough to be ignored in the Current Total AMS: no more than 5 percent 
of the product’s value of production or, for the non-product-specific AMS, the value of total 
                                                 
14 The Current Total AMS is thus “calculated in accordance … with the constituent data and methodology” 
of the AGST material. An AMS is calculated only by “taking into account the constituent data and 
methodology” of the AGST material, but an AMS is also “calculated in accordance with the provisions of 
Annex 3” of the AA. Annex 3 is thus more authoritative than the constituent data and methodology when 
calculating an AMS, as explained by the Panel and the Appellate Body in the dispute about Korea -Beef 
(WTO 2000b). (All quotes in this footnote are from Article 1(a) and 1(h) of the AA).   
     
15 The apparent contradiction between the requirements to include blue box payments in AMSs but exclude 
them from Current Total AMS (a sum of AMSs) may at some point need to be reconciled by legal experts. 
A similar issue would arise with respect to Article 6.2 support.    
 
16 A dictionary meaning of de minimis is “lacking significance or importance: so minor as to merit 
disregard” (Merriam-Webster 2006). The de minimis idea also parallels the idea of tolerance in 
engineering. Tolerance is defined as “the allowable deviation from a standard” (Merriam-Webster 2006). 
Consider the Total AMS commitment as the standard for allowed AMS support in the absence of any de 
minimis provisions. The de minimis rules allow for a certain upward deviation from that standard in the 
sense that the sum of all applied AMS support can exceed the Total AMS commitment. This is because 
some applied support, whether product-specific AMSs or the non-product-specific AMS, does not count in 
Current Total AMS as long as that applied support is small enough.  
 
17 In the Agreement on SCM, for example, the amount of a subsidy is de minimis if the subsidy is less than 
1 percent ad valorem (Article 11.9), a 5 percent threshold for total ad valorem subsidization of a product is 
specified in Article 6, and other threshold percentages are indicated in Article 27.  
   11
agricultural production. For developing countries the threshold is 10 percent (8.5 percent for 
China).  
The de minimis rules of the AA apply to a product’s whole AMS, i.e., an aggregation of 
support across several measures (and similarly for the non-product-specific AMS). They do not 
apply to individual subsidies or support on a measure by measure basis. This means that there is 
no classification of policy measures into de minimis measures and non-de minimis measures. A de 
minimis AMS may of course consist of support provided through only one measure, in which case 
the measure can be thought of as providing only de minimis support.  
De minimis support is generated by measures in the non-green, non-blue, non-Article 6.2 
category of measures (i.e., amber, using one of the colour codes not in the AA). It is exemptible 
from Current Total AMS only because it is so relatively small. However, while some observers 
hold that “de minimis” is amber, others submit that “de minimis” is not amber. Table 1 illustrates 
some of these differences in opinion (the purpose of Table 1 is to underscore the confusion in 
communications, not to highlight de minimis as amber or not as a major conceptual distinction.) 
The root of the labelling problem seems to be uncertainty about the amber colour: does it attach 
to a category of measures, similar to the so-called green and blue boxes, or to a commitment 
(Total AMS) and/or a measurement of support (Current Total AMS)?  
De minimis allowance and de minimis threshold. The AA does not use the terms de 
minimis allowance or de minimis threshold, but both terms haven proven useful in discourse 
about the de minimis rules. The two terms refer to the same monetary amount. As a de minimis 
allowance, it could be thought of as the amount within which an AMS is excludable from Current 
Total AMS as de minimis. As a de minimis threshold, it could be thought of as the amount at 
which an AMS switches from being de minimis into having to be included in Current Total AMS. 
The threshold defined by the de minimis rules is different in nature from a commitment. 
The idea of a threshold is that an AMS can increase from zero without any particular consequence 
until it reaches the threshold level. However, the consequence of the AMS exceeding that level is 
immediate: the whole AMS (not just that part of the AMS that exceeds the threshold) is included 
in Current Total AMS. There is no obligation to keep the AMS at or below the threshold, in 
contrast to the obligation not to exceed the Total AMS commitment. Moreover, the de minimis 
threshold or allowance is variable because it is a fixed proportion of the value of production, 
which varies from year to year. If a country’s nominal value of total agricultural production 
grows over time, even through inflation or currency depreciation, the de minimis threshold or   12
allowance grows in nominal terms, in contrast to the fixity of the Total AMS commitment. If the 
value of production declines, so does the de minimis threshold or allowance.
18 
The AA uses a concept similar to a variable allowance when it refers to Members who do 
not have a scheduled Total AMS commitment. In such cases the support to agricultural producers 
must not exceed the “de minimis level set out in paragraph 4 of Article 6” (Article 7.2(b)). 
However, since Current Total AMS in such cases has to be zero, there is no threshold effect, only 
the range or de minimis allowance within which AMS support must be kept.  
Support and subsidies. The terms support and subsidies are often used interchangeably 
(see, e.g., the quote from Khor (2006) above). However, the AA defines AMS as a measurement 
of support, not explicitly as a measurement of subsidies. A subsidy has a connotation of a 
budgetary payment by government, while support encompasses a broader meaning for many 
observers.
19 The rules for calculating AMS in Annex 3 require the inclusion of market price 
support in AMS. This component of AMS is based on a price gap, not a budgetary payment. In 
this sense an AMS is akin to the OECD Producer Support Estimate (see below).  
Including market price support in AMS is not merely a quibble about words: it 
demarcates the boundaries of the set of support measures that are subject to the AA domestic 
support discipline. This is why the distinction between subsidy and support matters. The explicit 
inclusion of market price support in the measured support under the AA is consistent with how 
some other WTO agreements treat price support: both the GATT (Article XVI) and the 
Agreement on SCM (Article 1.1(a)(2)) make a point of including price support in what they mean 
by a subsidy (WTO 1995b).
20 This seems to indicate a desire to have these rules apply to a wider 
set of measures than those captured in the dictionary meaning of subsidy.  
Measuring support for WTO purposes and for other purposes. Applying the AA rules for 
classification of measures and measurement of support is essential in the context of “the long-
term objective of substantial progressive reductions in support and protection resulting in 
fundamental reform” (Article 20). The AA requires the Committee on Agriculture to carry out a 
                                                 
18 The market price support component of an AMS can be reduced by reducing the applied administered 
price. In some situations the reduction of the applied administered price would also reduce the domestic 
price used to estimate the value of production, thus lowering the de minimis threshold. 
  
19 One meaning of subsidy is “a grant or gift of money: … a grant by a government to a private person or 
company to assist an enterprise deemed advantageous to the public” (Merriam-Webster 2006). One 
meaning of the noun support is “the act of supporting …” and two meanings of the verb support are “to pay 
the costs of“ and “to maintain (a price) at a desired level by purchases or loans” (Merriam-Webster 2006). 
 
20 A dictionary meaning of price support is “artificial maintenance of prices (as of a raw material) at some 
predetermined level usually through government action” (Merriam-Webster 2006).  The meaning in WTO 
agreements may of course be different.   13
review of the implementation of commitments based on notifications submitted by Members. The 
information submitted by a Member for the Committee review can be used, along with other 
information, in the settlement of disputes and is also of some use for economic analysis.   
The Committee has decided on the formats of such notifications, which in many ways 
resemble the formats used in the Uruguay Round for the AGST material (WTO1995a). A 
Member reports its domestic support separately for each kind of measure (“measure type”): 
support under green box measures in one table, support under Article 6.2 measures in a second 
table, blue box payments in a third, and the calculation of Current Total AMS, allowing for de 
minimis AMSs, in a system of linked tables. If a Member claims that support is to be excluded 
from Current Total AMS, Members sometimes ask for a justification for such classification of the 
underlying measure. A Member may then realize that the particular classification is not justified 
and submits a revised notification showing a different classification. Contrary to the impression 
of some, it is thus not the WTO or the WTO Secretariat that classifies a Member’s measures by 
coloured box.  
AMSs and Current Total AMS are measured for the purpose of comparing the amount of 
certain applied support against the bound Total AMS commitment.
21 Support to farmers is also 
measured for other purposes using different methods. The most recognized measurement is the 
Producer Support Estimate (PSE) along with its related indicators (OECD 2005). The OECD 
relies on these indicators for its annual monitoring and evaluation of agricultural policies and they 
are not used in the context of binding commitments. The PSE includes market price support and 
budgetary payments. The market price support in PSE is measured differently than market price 
support in the AA, but both are based on a price gap. The price gap in PSE is based on a current 
border reference price and a domestic market price, which means that it tends to vary more from 
year to year than the price gap in AMS. 
A country’s PSE usually includes support resulting from a larger set of policy measures 
than does the Current Total AMS. This is because the PSE does not apply the exemptions from 
Current Total AMS, i.e., green box, blue box, and Article 6.2, and there are no de minimis 
provisions for PSE. Preparing the PSE estimate can still be of some help to a Member in 
calculating its Current Total AMS. PSE is measured for numerous Members of the WTO, which 
facilitates the review in the Committee on Agriculture of Members’ implementation of their 
commitments under Article 18. It may help Members to identify the policy measures they would 
                                                 
21 Because of differences in measurement methods, comparing a product’s AMS across countries is often 
relatively meaningless.    14
expect to see reported in a Member’s notification and it may provide information on the size and 
nature of the associated support. 
 
2004 Framework Provisions on Domestic Support 
The 2004 Framework introduces new kinds of commitments in domestic support and changes 
certain rules and criteria, as follows: 
 
o  Continued from AA:  
o  Current Total AMS to stay within Total AMS commitment 
  note: green box support, Article 6.2 support, blue box payments and de 
minimis AMSs remain outside of Current Total AMS 
o  New:  
o  Reduce Total AMS commitment 
o  Reduce de minimis percentage for some Members to below its setting in the AA 
o  Expand criteria for blue box payments 
  note: exempts support under more kinds of policy measures from being 
counted in Current Total AMS 
o  Introduce commitment on sum of blue box payments 
o  Introduce commitments on the individual product-specific AMSs 
  note: as in AA, any product’s applied product-specific AMS is also an 
element of the Current Total AMS if it exceeds the de minimis threshold 
of that product. 
  note: the non-product-specific AMS is not individually constrained but a 
de minimis threshold applies  
o  Introduce commitment on Overall Trade-Distorting Support (OTDS) 
  note: requires introduction of Current OTDS, i.e., the sum of Current 
Total AMS, de minimis AMSs (whether product-specific or non-product-
specific), and blue box payments 
  note: Current OTDS to stay below OTDS commitment 
  note: Article 6.2 support may not be subject to this commitment.  
All of these constraints apply separately and simultaneously and thus overlap to some 
extent. Figure 2 illustrates the additional constraints beyond those of the AA There is also the 
practical constraint of not being able to fully utilize the sum of the individually constrained 
components of distorting support, i.e., the constraint in the form of Maximum Usable   15
Components (Brink 2006). The introduction of the bound commitment on OTDS requires 
introducing also a measurement that is not explicit in the Framework, namely a Current Overall 
Trade-Distorting Support (Current OTDS). It would include Current Total AMS, applied blue box 
payments, and all AMSs excluded from Current Total AMS on grounds of being de minimis. 
Article 6.2 support, in spite of being trade-distorting, would seem to be excluded although the 
argument for excluding it hinges only on it not being mentioned in the Framework’s listing of the 
elements of the overall base. The use of Current OTDS parallels the use of Current Total AMS: it 
will demonstrate that certain applied support does not exceed the new commitment on OTDS.  
 
Challenges in Analysis of Domestic Support 
Nature of domestic support provisions. Analysis of domestic support provisions differs 
significantly in nature from analysis of market access provisions. The 2004 Framework does not 
introduce new kinds of market access commitments other than the existing ones of tariffs and 
tariff rate quotas, which are concepts that are routinely represented in economic analysis. Many 
concepts in domestic support, on the other hand, find their counterparts in economics-based 
analysis only with difficulty, if at all. A country can decide to apply a lower tariff than the bound 
tariff or apply a tariff rate quota larger than the bound quota. Such a decision can be confined to 
some specific products and it can be reversed. In domestic support a country’s policy decisions 
tend to generate more complicated and interdependent changes in several measurements of 
applied support at the same time, often extending to several product sectors. The sequence of 
reforms of the European Union’s farm policy and the sequence of U.S. farm acts illustrate the 
multitude of changes in policy settings to be accounted for in measurements of applied domestic 
support in a given year. A complete reversal of such policy changes would be unlikely in practice, 
given the number of policy settings to be reversed. Even if a complete reversal was practically 
possible in a given later year, the measurements of applied support would still be different 
because they depend to some extent on quantities and values observed in the given later year.  
When looking at applied support it is necessary to distinguish between de minimis AMSs 
and the corresponding de minimis allowances. This is often a surprisingly difficult distinction to 
make. The shorthand expression of just “de minimis” when speaking of either the AMS or the 
allowance may be at the root of the difficulty. This shorthand is common, especially in popular 
media coverage. 
Time specificity of measured support: past, current, future. Analysis of the domestic 
support area of the negotiations tends to focus on two issues: contrasting Current Total AMS in 
past years against a new, smaller Total AMS commitment than the existing Final Bound Total   16
AMS commitment, and contrasting certain applied support in past years against several of the 
new constraints. The applied support measurements are often those of the recent past or even 
going back to the 1995 beginning of the AA. This is perhaps of some interest, but it would seem 
more relevant to look ahead and evaluate the new commitments and rules in the context of the 
present policy set and policy settings or a range of potential future sets and settings.
22  
Whatever the time frame, the terminology of the AA and the texts emanating from the 
negotiations seems to lay a trap for the casual analyst. This has to do with a term such as Current 
Total AMS and by extension also Current OTDS. The AA defines Current Total AMS as “the 
level of support actually provided during any year of the implementation period and thereafter” 
(Article 1(h)). “Current” thus means the year in which support is provided. Letting “Current” 
retain this meaning of support in a given year, other time-defining terms need to be used to 
indicate what that year is, such as past, 2000, 2006, 2014, or future. This explains the need for the 
somewhat awkward-sounding expression future Current Total AMS, as distinguished from the 
Current Total AMS of the present year or the recent past. 
Analysis may be based on a model and an associated data set that represent a particular 
past year, such as 2001. The analyst then introduces policy settings that represent the actual 
policy changes between 2001 and, say, 2006. The resulting measurements of applied support in 
2006 are then contrasted against the constraints resulting from full implementation of the 
hypothesized commitments at the end of the implementation period. The challenges in presenting 
the results of this relatively complicated procedure are perhaps not fully appreciated. If, for 
example, the implementation or phase-in period is six years, starting in 2008, the findings of the 
analysis would need to be couched in language such as “Comparing the 2014 end point 
constraints to the measurements of applied support deriving from the 2006 policy measures, 
based on assumptions about 2014 classification of policy measures and methods for measuring 
support, shows that support in Country X would be constrained in the following ways….”. Such a 
qualified comparison would still seem to be more informative than comparing a 2014 end point 
to, say, notified support from the set of 2001 or 2003 policy measures. 
Incorporating policy behaviour in the model requires assumptions about how the 
modelled country interprets the rules of the AA and the implications for its ability to comply with 
its future domestic support commitments. However, a standard model may not include the 
                                                 
22 One example of the complexities in comparing domestic support measurements arises in applying the de 
minimis rules. Although the new, smaller Total AMS commitment would in many cases be accompanied by 
a lower de minimis percentage, the Current Total AMS of past years was calculated with the larger AA de 
minimis percentage. If the Current Total AMS of past years is not recalculated with the lower de minimis 
percentage, comparing the past Current Total AMS with the new, smaller Total AMS commitment 
confounds the effects of reducing the Total AMS commitment and reducing the de minimis percentage.   17
variables that matter in measuring domestic support for AMS purposes. For example, it may 
represent market price support by the gap between a border price and a domestic price (as in PSE 
measurement), not between the fixed external reference price and the applied administered price. 
Incorporating the applied administered price in the model could allow a simple calculation of 
future market price support for AMS purposes and also make it possible to account for any 
interactions between the applied administered price and other perhaps more economically 
important variables. 
From Framework to analysis. The steps between written statements becoming available 
from the negotiations, such as written proposals, Chair’s texts, Ministerial statements, and the 
2004 Framework, on the one hand, and the incorporation of this information in quantitative 
analysis, on the other, are complicated. Model-based quantitative analysis relies on data sets and 
structures that make sense in terms of economics. What is available from negotiations is rarely 
presented in terms of economics (legal experts may say that it is rarely presented in terms of law 
either). The analyst must not only interpret what is actually being said in the documents at hand 
but must also convert that understanding into relationships that can be represented in the model. 
Not every element of the Framework needs to be modelled, of course, but having a good grasp of 
what is said and meant in such documents would seem to be crucial. 
Examples of interpretations of the domestic support provisions of the Framework when 
preparing for quantitative analysis with the help of the GTAP model are given by, e.g., Jensen 
and Zobbe (2005), Kommerskollegium (2006), and Walsh (2005). There are mainly three steps.  
o  Interpret the Framework and selected proposals in order to generate numerical 
estimates of the constraints and thresholds that would apply under each reduction 
scenario. This involves, e.g., making assumptions about (a) base periods for the base 
OTDS, the blue box payments, the values of production, and the caps on product-
specific AMSs (and the method to establish these caps), (b) the size of reductions 
applying to base OTDS, Final Bound Total AMS commitment, and de minimis 
percentages, and (c) the rules for classifying support measures as green or blue.  
o  Starting from the classifications, measurements and data the country has used in its 
notifications to the Committee on Agriculture, (a) interpret the policy changes that 
have been decided since the last notification and (b) develop the data needed for a 
hypothetical notification for a more recent year or a future year in order to show 
compliance with the new constraints. This would involve, for example, estimating the 
effects of the 2005 EU sugar reform on future EU market price support, value of   18
production, and amounts of payments in the AMS, blue and green categories, 
compared to what was shown in the latest (2003/04) notification.  
o  Identify situations where the hypothetically notified support would exceed a 
constraint. These situations would indicate either that the constraint is unrealistically 
tight under the assumed policy scenario and the country concerned would find it 
difficult to accept it as an outcome of the negotiations, or that the country concerned 
would need to change its policy measures to allow its classification of measures and 
measurement of support to demonstrate future conformity with all the commitments. 
Projecting policy change and the corresponding classification and measurement. Since 
notifications are not available, it is not possible to observe how Member such as the EU and the 
USA classify new policy measures and measure support in 2006. The latest notifications (2003/04 
for the EU and 2001 for the USA) are of only limited value since policy measures were 
introduced or changed in both the EU and the USA more recently. It is therefore necessary to 
make assumptions about the present or future classification of policy measures and measurement 
of support in terms of the AA and the Framework.
23 
The EU farm policy reforms of 2003, 2004 and 2005 are quite specific about the support 
measures in place in 2006, and so is the U.S. farm act (Farm Bill) of 2002. It is also possible to 
speculate about the outcome of the EU reforms currently being discussed, which may include 
elimination or reduction of product-specific AMSs (and EMSs) for fruits and vegetables and 
wine, perhaps combined with increases in support provided through policy measures claimed as 
green or blue. This would reduce Current Total AMS by several billions of euros more than the 
reductions resulting from the policy decisions of 2003, 2004, and 2005. For the USA there is less 
fodder for speculation, and a continuation of the 2002 farm act is a common assumption. Many 
also see the abolition of the support price for milk as possible means to eliminate the measured 
market price support for milk for the USA. Such a future step, which would reduce the Current 
Total AMS by several billions of dollars, needs to be accounted for when assessing the effects of 
new constraints in domestic support.  
It is unclear how the EU and the USA will report certain payments in light of the Panel 
on U.S. cotton having disqualified the U.S. Direct Payments program from being a green box 
measure. For the EU there is also uncertainty about the measurement of market price support in 
view of the abolition of intervention prices for some products. The EU intervention price is the 
                                                 
23 Results of such efforts concerning the EU and/or the USA are reported by, e.g., Brink (2006), Buteault 
and Bureau (2006), Jensen and Zobbe (2005), Kutas (2006), Sumner (2005), and Walsh et al. (2005). 
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“applied administered price” for AMS purposes for several products. New policy prices (basic 
price or reference price) have been introduced for some products in place of intervention prices. 
They can have different functions than the intervention prices, and it is not clear what role, if any, 
the EU would assign to them when measuring market price support.  
 
Conclusions 
There is much confusion about the domestic support concepts of the AA and in the Doha 
negotiations. Khor’s (2006) diagnosis in the opening quote is correct. However, the root of the 
confusion is not to be found in the AA itself: the AA is very clear about the distinctions that need 
to be made. This concerns distinctions between such concepts as classification of policy measures 
and measurement of support, between subsidies and support, between commitment (or allowed 
amount) and applied (or actual) support provided, between measures subject to commitment and 
measures exempt from commitment (or boxes of different colour and other categories), between 
headings and criteria, between AMS and Total AMS, between de minimis AMSs and other 
AMSs, between the commitment under the AA and commitments introduced in the Doha 
negotiations, and between measures in place one year and measures in place in a later year. 
Confusion may arise out of the efforts of analysts and commentators to interpret and 
simplify what the AA and negotiating proposals say. Some communications efforts may even 
inadvertently add to the confusion when they, instead of being based on the AA, further 
reinterpret and rephrase what other analysts and commentators have said. This confusing state of 
affairs can be aggravated when the provisions of the AA are evaluated in particular ways. For 
example, a commentator may contrast the implications of the AA against the implications that the 
commentator wished would have resulted from the AA, or a commentator may contrast the reality 
of the AA against similar or corresponding concepts used in economic analysis.  
Does this matter? It may not matter much for negotiators who tend to see through the 
imprecise or incorrect arguments they encounter. Nor may it matter much for those who argue 
that a certain ambiguity or lack of precision makes it easier to accommodate differences in view, 
in spite of the difficulties that will be faced in the future interpretation of such provisions. It may 
matter more for the shaping of the views of less well-informed interest groups, who in some cases 
seem to rely considerably on information propagated by observers with what appears to be 
somewhat shallow insights into the provisions of the AA. And it matters much for the economic 
analyst who, if relying overly on second hand or third hand renditions of the AA by well-
intentioned but less than fully informed observers, may design a model or use data in ways that 
effectively limit the usefulness of the findings.   20
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Table 1. Examples of considering de minimis as amber or not 
De minimis is amber  De minimis is not amber 
“The WTO assigns all subsidies outside of the 
green and blue boxes and development 
measures -- such as support prices, direct 
production subsidies, and input subsidies, 
including those permitted under the de minimis 
rules -- to an ‘amber’ box.” (Panagariya 2005) 
“The WTO classifies domestic support into 
measures which are disciplined and thus 
subject to reduction commitments (also 
known as Amber box payments) … Support 
which is not subject to reduction 
commitments consists of the following: … 
de minimis payments.” and “Figure 2. WTO 
Measures of Domestic Support” (Baffes and 
de Gorter 2005) 
“De minimis amber supports are allowed to be 
5 percent of the value of agricultural 
production for developed countries and 10 
percent for developing countries.” (Sumner 
2005) 
“Figure 1: Schema for Reporting of 
Domestic Support Commitments” (Josling 
2003) clearly separates amber box and de 
minimis exemptions. Later writings reveal a 
more inclusive view of “amber box” 
(Josling 2006).  
“a) the Amber Box, comprising de-minimis 
support and AMS, … “ (G20 2004; G33 2005) 
“Remember, the de minimis and the Amber 
Box are mutually exclusive categories.” 
(Deputy Assistant USTR 2006) 
“All domestic support measures considered to 
distort production and trade (with some 
exceptions) fall into the amber box, defined in 
Article 6 of the Agriculture Agreement as all 
domestic supports except those in the blue and 
green boxes. … These supports are subject to 
limits: 'de minimis' are allowed (up to 5 % of 
agricultural production for developed countries, 
10 % for developing countries).” (EC 2005) 
“De minimis provisions. This refers to Art. 
6.4 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA) which allows WTO Members to 
exempt from the calculation of the “amber 
box” (i.e. AMS) product-specific and non-
product-specific support below a certain 
threshold level.” (South Centre 2006) 
 
Note: these quotes are examples only. Authors and institutions may at different times have 
revealed different views. 
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